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ABSTRACT: Throughout the world, regardless of economic status, there have been multiple
complications with the lives and experiences of minorities in multiethnic state populations. Research
regarding multiethnic state populations either have a Western focus or contrast non-Western multiethnic
cultural formations from Western ones. Neither of these trends fully delve into the heart of this global
issue. The inquiry examines whether or not a fully functional multiethnic state can exist in today’s world.
By studying two emerging middle powers, Nigeria and Pakistan, it would be an indicator as to whether or
not a nation state of this construction is plausible for not only these countries but others with similar
compositions. After analyzing ethnic overlap, wealth and standard of living, and nationalism in these two
countries, the conclusion asserts this type of government in its current formation is not feasible. It
recommends a communal federalist structure to better address the needs of all ethnic groups.
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Introduction
The concept of a nation state is relatively new in terms of world history. For most of history,
humans have organized themselves according to tribes, or what most closely mirrors what we refer to as
ethnicity. Given the advent of the modern state, combined with colonialism and the aftermaths of multiple
wars, we now live in a society where we are not only organized by ethnicity but by nation. In this system
we rely on a government to regulate us and serve the interests of the people. This gets increasingly more
complicated when the government is meant to serve the best interests of groups who have much different
cultural desires and histories. Given the tumult in today’s global political climate, it makes sense to
question whether or not this concept is still reasonable: one singular government comprised of multiple
ethnicities. Is it too ambitious or are our current examples simply overrun with corruption?
For the scope of this inquiry it made sense to focus on two regional giants, Nigeria and Pakistan,
that could be used to represent multiple countries with comparable histories. Both countries are similar in
that they are both former British colonies. They are also similar in their country makeup. Both of them
have significant ethnic populations that lie outside of their proper borders. The two countries are
emerging powerhouses within their respective regions with complex problems and histories including but
not limited to ethnic violence, internal security, neighboring conflict, unstable economies, and more.
Uncovering the viability of a multi ethnic state in these two countries might extend itself to other
countries with similar structures and to evaluate whether or not this type of state is feasible.
Methodology
The research for this thesis was designed based on my interest on the functionality of multi-ethnic
states in various regions. Nigeria was a natural starting place due to the country’s relevance and
symbolism for sub-Saharan Africa and other former Western European colonies. I sought to compare
Nigeria with another nation with a background similar enough it warranted a comparison, yet diverse
enough in history it was worth studying on its which lead my research to Pakistan. The thesis examines
whether or not a multiethnic state government many nations in the world subscribes to is feasible for
Nigeria and Pakistan. Analysis drawn from that conclusion, will then be applied to the practicality of this
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system working for other nation states. The thesis will conclude with points for future research and
potential points of contention followed by an overall conclusion.
The primary way I am conducting research for my topic is through analyzing scholarly sources
and contemporary news articles. Prior to this thesis, research on the topic on multi-ethnic states has been
largely theoretical and qualitative rather than empirical and quantitative. This thesis follows suit and as a
result, interviews were not deemed as necessary. While I may occasionally reference quantitative studies,
the overall makeup of the thesis will center on a qualitative approach to the inquiry. Other forms of
research do not match the scope of thesis and therefore will not be heavily utilized. Further, the thesis
question itself centers on two case studies: Nigeria and Pakistan. Due to the nature of a multiethnic state
inquiry, there will be a large component dedicated to researching the ethnic composition and histories of
the respective countries which is necessary to understand their current multiethnic government structures.
While these two nation states are the heart of the thesis, I will make reference to relevant neighboring
countries and region such as the Sahel region of Western sub-Saharan Africa, Afghanistan, and the Indian
sub-continent. Then, I will conclude with my assessment of their ethnic overlap, wealth, and nationalism
in the respective countries to make a judgement on the overall viability of multiethnic states.
Literature Review
Today there is much debate regarding the capability of a multi-ethnic state. When analyzing the
functionality of multi-ethnic state, it is important to define those terms for the purposes of the inquiry.
Although there is literature that is global in scope specifically regarding multiethnic governance, most of
it is examined through case studies, similar to this inquiry. It is also necessary to understand past global
research on this subject along with specific attention paid to research on the ethnic makeup and the
complications associated with it in Nigeria and Pakistan.
To better understand the government’s relationship in dealing with multiethnic populations, it is
useful to understand the history of the term multiethnic and what it relates to. A good working definition
comes from a book written by Feliks Gross in 1999 where he elaborates on the meaning of multiethnic
and state and describes its relevance in a global context. Gross provides important insight when he
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describes the different bonds that are of relevance when describing the connections between tribes and
ethnicities. He emphasizes the importance of common descent and neighborhood as basic principles of
social organization.i He explains further:
By social bond we understand a set of needs and values, and corresponding goals and interests, as
well as norms that prompt association into coherent groups. Here belong common descent groups
… associated by elementary needs, shared interests and goals, and integrated also by common
ancestry or belief in common origin as wells as religion.ii
He goes on to describe territorial proximity combined with these social bonds band together to protect
each other against hostile outside forcesiii. He is providing relevant insight about the strength of the ties
within these ethnic groups and how they inspire strong motivations and loyalty.
After a better understanding of the connections within ethnic groups, it is useful to understand the
role different ones have within the national equation. He first describes the importance of citizenship and
the inclusion of minorities in the national ethos:
In the past… general cultural minorities had a rightful position, as well as all the benefits of broad
toleration, often tantamount … to full equality with the personal rights enjoyed by the citizen of
the dominant nation. In some other nations … minorities were discriminated against in public
policies as well as in everyday life. Today, the political situation of an individual, a member of a
minority or majority, is articulated in citizenship. The nature of citizenship … expresses the entire
political system. It is an indicator of individual rights and freedom.iv
Gross raises the question of equality between ethnic minorities and distinctions between who is and is not
a full citizen. The idea of equal rights and protections under the law is an issue of high priority for states
responsible for multiple ethnic groups. When he calls the citizenship question an indicator of the political
system, it acknowledges the implications the treatment of ethnic minorities has on the overall
functionality of the state. The treatment of all citizens, ethnicity included, is important for evaluating the
effectiveness of the government as a whole.

Tella-Martins 7
With the understanding of the makeup of ethnicities and citizenship, it is then easier to analyze
the setup of a state that must handle these complexities. After describing what he believes to be important
in regards of citizenship and the government’s relations with ethnic minorities, Gross goes deeper into the
overall construction of a state and what that entails:
Construction of a state, or what we call today nation building, is … a kind of social political
technique. Some of the historical patterns of a multiethnic state … were rather simple and
repetitive. … the defeated were always at the mercy of the victors. The construction of the state at
its very historical or prehistorical beginnings sets the direction of its development. Moreover, this
decides the position and in consequence the fate of an individual, a subject or a citizen.v
Gross details what is at stake in the discussion of multiethnic states. He explains the reputation and
success of the state is based on its construction. He is specifically referring to its ethnic composition and
how certain tribes end up within a collective with other tribes to then form an overarching national
identity. Understanding this is integral to evaluating the general viability of a state with this composition.
Gross then delves into historical treatment of ethnic minorities within a multiethnic state. Gross
discusses how historical nation states used to be built on the backs of conquered minorities, “In some
historical cases, the entire conquered nation as subjugated ethnic groups, was forced into servitude. …
Hence, the original multiethnic state … was … structured into ethnoclasses of various levels.”vi This is an
important inclusion because it acknowledges the precedence for the overarching question of a viability of
the multiethnic state. It references discrimination and differing treatment among ethnic minorities may be
within the design of this specific political system.
For the purposes of this study, a multiethnic state will refer to a nation comprised of four or more
significant, more than four percent, ethnic populations. This definition is supplemented from research
done by University of California, Davis educator, John Stanfield II, in which he refers to multiethnic
societies and regions as “culturally plural social organizations” with historical roots of “culturally
different populations migrating to geographical spaces defined as kingdoms, colonies, nation states,
continents, or subcontinents”.vii This criterion fits both Nigeria and Pakistan, with Nigeria having
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hundreds of ethnic populations and Pakistan having five significant ethnic populations with varying
influence and several fewer populations, while relevant, are not numerous enough to largely impact
national policy and action.
The research on the topic of multiethnic state functionality varies greatly depending on the era
from which it was written. Much of the research written in the later twentieth century is global in scope
and focuses on analysis of the successes and failures of newly created states. This is understandable
considering the world’s collective tumult throughout the century, specifically the latter half with the end
of World War II and formal colonies declaring their independence. As Walker Connor of Oxford details
in 1978:
Events of the past decade have by now impressed … ethnonationalism constitutes a major and
growing threat to the political stability of most states. Rather than witnessing an evolution of
stable state – or suprastate communities, the observer of global politics has viewed a succession
of situations involving competing allegiances in which people have illustrated that an intuitive
bond felt toward an informal and unstructured subdivision of mankind is far more profound and
potent than are the ties that bind them to formal and legalistic state structure in which they find
themselves.viii
These brands of concerns should be expected given the circumstances under which many of the recently
independent states developed. A lot of the original boundaries for these new nations were purely colonial
and not focused on the different tribal and cultural groups being drawn within these lines. Even without
the ethnic animosity within the country, it is doubly hard to transfer allegiances from an individual tribal
group to a national identity that may not have much depth outside of shared colonial trauma.
Creating nation states with countries that are not fond of one another is a recipe for political
chaos, as Connor found. He further describes this when he describes the violence that followed in “Third
World states” post-independence such as, “Burma, … , India, Iraq, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan …
, and Uganda” and their “failure of governments to induce a substantial segment of their citizenry to
transfer their primary loyalty from a human grouping to the state.”ix Although focuses much of his energy
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on newer nation states facing this issue, he is not unaware different variations of the same problem apply
to “First” and “Second World” countries as he describes them as not immune to “ethnically motivated
unrest.” He does distinguish Marxist-Leninist states and how they say their system of government was
able to propel them politically. He mentions how these brands of nations states claimed they,
“successfully solved what they call their national question” by carrying out Lenin’s prescriptions by
devitalizing nationalism at home.x By describing the differing symptoms of the same problem, Connor is
acknowledging the overall functionality of multiethnic states. By understanding even in more
economically stable countries, there are still viable concerns about ethnic tensions that permeate that
global ethos that does not discriminate based on racial, religion, or the wealth composition of a given
country.
Some research focuses heavily on nationalism and what that represents for a country’s members
and how that informs their behavior. In a book by Milica Zarkovic Bookman, she distinguishes between
the term “nation” and “state” and how they are not interchangeable for her purposes as both terms
connote different relationship to the country in question:
A nation is ‘a body of citizens bound by shared memories and a common culture, occupying a
compact territory with a unified economy and identical rights and duties. A nation is therefore a
wider concept than an ethnic group. … The term nation underlies the concept of nationalism …
[nationalism] does in fact connote more, embodying culture, ethnicity, and language. … The term
nation also underlies the term nation-state, in which national and political borders coincide.xi
This builds upon the ideas of Connor and Gross by adding the political implications to the ethnic identity.
Although the political may have already been imposed on the ethnicity, the concept of a nation and
nationalism carries responsibilities of the ethnicities living within the respective countries’ borders.
This goes into the question of whether or not it is capable for citizens of different ethnic groups to
maintain a sort of dual loyalty. One loyalty to the ethnicity and one to the nation. This is a dilemma
Graham Smith describes in a book discussing the relationship between federalism and the multiethnic
state:
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Federalism's success in this endeavor necessarily hinges upon whether federations constructed on
the basis of ethno-regional markers facilitate the establishment of a dual identity or, as their
critics maintain, reinforce, even reify, ethnic, tribal, linguistic and religious divisions, making
inter-communal tensions and even fragmentation that much more probable.xii
According to Smith, federalism is, “an ideology which holds that the ideal organization of human affairs
is best reflected in the celebration of diversity through unity.”xiii It gets to the heart of the inquiry by
questioning the possibility of government to successfully bridge the gap between the two stark identities.
He then cites Nigeria as a country that has not yet proven whether or not this endeavor is successful or a
failure. He goes on to question:
It may well therefore be… only through constructing our political communities on the basis of ‘a
constitutional patriotism’ that respects all forms of cultural difference and therefore reflects the
wishes of all groups within civil society … to live as they wish, and to compete politically by
soliciting the voluntary choices of individuals, that federation will act as an antidote to
nationalism. Much however will depend upon the nature of the particular federal arrangement and
of the symbolic meanings behind the identific boundaries upon which federalism is constructed.xiv
The functionality of a multiethnic state, according to Smith, relies on the acknowledgment and respect of
all ethnicities living within the country. The success of this goal depends on the commitment of the
government in question.
It is important to evaluate the greater consequences of attempting to create a government
comprised of multiple ethnicities. This is a point emphasized by Alexander Murphy in his research
specifying on territorial policies of multiethnic states:
Multiethnic societies are frequently fraught with tensions. Laws that differentiate between groups
on the basis of cultural criteria emerge from these tensions and in turn have a role in shaping
them. … That is, attention should be given not only to the effects of ethnic policies but also to the
circumstances that produce them and to the role of local context in shaping their consequences.xv
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The concept of land and who it belongs is always a difficult issue. Further complicated by the complex
relationships between ethnic groups, the issue gets even more intense. This is important to understand the
overall land disputes and claims made by ethnic minorities within in multiethnic countries. It adds another
layer of the struggles unique to that of a multiethnic state.
Other research helpful to the scope of this inquiry includes studies from members of the nations
in question. There has been much Nigerian scholarship on this topic in particularly, which is expected
given Nigeria’s complex and unique ethnic makeup. This research is doubly important for this study as it
comes off an understanding of the general multiethnic state questions and asks deeper ones particular to
Nigeria and other nations of a similar composition. One study that fits this mandate is from J Bayo
Adekanye of the University of Ibadan in Nigeria. Adekanye questions and analyzes the concept of powersharing and its specific implications on Nigeria:
A core aspect of power-sharing is that it is opposed to the adoption institutional structures and
procedures which would logically involve conflict-exacerbating consequences for deeply divided
societies. Particularly targeted is the principle of majoritarianism in its undiluted form, which is
held as simply unsuitable for governing deeply divided societies.xvi
Adekanye goes on to describe majoritarianism as the concept of winner takes all and the majority ruling
and the different iterations this can hold. Adekanye mentions one- or two-party systems taking
precedence over multi-party ones, along with non-proportional electoral systems and political
representation. These systems that may work for nations that are homogenous is makeup is incongruent
with that of multiethnic states, Nigeria in particular. Given the ethnic diversity systems that heavily favor
one over the other would exacerbate deep seated conflict. Power-sharing is the solution he presents citing
it allows for possible minority veto, regional autonomy, and proportional representation.xvii
As what Adekanye described is relevant in to Pakistan as well, it is also important to understand
past literature on the country specifically. They have an interesting relationship with ethnicity as well, as
Rashid Abbas and Farida Shaheed describe when discussing the relationship between Pakistani ethnicity
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and the elites of the country. In their abstract, they reference the makeup of Pakistan and how ethnicity
was such a point of conflict, a part of the country self-segregated and became its own state:
Although Islam provided a unifying element in Pakistan, the ethnic diversity of the country
proved to be a source of dissension and conflicts. The suthors attribute this largely to failures of
national leadership to share power and to pursue equitable development policies. The initial
disparities in resources and development among different ethnic groups were exacerbated by
concentration of power at the center and discriminatory economic policies. The failure to share
power and abide by the electoral process resulted in a dismemberment of the country with the
creation of Bangladesh as a separate state.xviii
This goes to the point of occasional shared social ties not being enough to resolve ethnic conflict.
Although there may be a shared identity, the allegiance within ethnic group can still supersede the overall
attempted national ethos, as is the case in Bangladesh, seeing as the country separated. This is important
to contextualize Pakistan but also to provide examples how seemingly unifying factors may not be
enough to connect a multiethnic state.
Much research has been conducted on this topic, seeing as it is one of the more pressing issues of
our time. Many governments currently or are becoming multiethnic states due to globalism, migration,
and refugee crises among other reasons. Combined with a history of colonialism and poorly drawn
borders, this leads to the government being accountable for more than one ethnic group with significant
influence and importance to an attempted national identity. Given the history of the nation state, with
different treatment of ethnic minorities, it begs the question whether or not this type of government is
viable. Previous research on the topic dives into different aspects on the question depending on system of
government, citizenship, power structure, and more. This study intends to distinguish itself based on the
history and unintentional composition of the nation state itself.
Country Profiles
The organization of different ethnic groups and their relationships with neighboring groups is a
concept that originates in ancient times that still has implications to this day. It is important to highlight
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the stories of Nigeria and Pakistan did not begin nor end with colonialism. The history of both these
peoples serves to be some of the first forms of advanced civilization. One of the lasting impacts of
colonialism on a nation is its ability to make it seem as though the story of the people only started with
the arrival of the Europeans on their shores. Not only is this assumption dangerous, as it aids the idea of
the people of these areas as primitive, but it also ignores the complicated political structures that existed
long before their colonizers arrival. Nowhere is this truer than the subject of these case studies, Nigeria
and Pakistan, where the borders designated by the British left multiple rival ethnic groups to try and find a
unified identity. Understanding the foundations of these groups’ identities is necessary to better
understand their current systems of government and political issues.
Introduction to Nigeria: To understand Nigeria is to understand how a collection of more than 250
ethnic groups and 300 unique languages found themselves within the borders of one unified country.
They are the seventh most populous nation in the world, with more than an estimated 200 million people,
which is expected to be behind only India and China, in population totals, in 2050.
Any research on Nigeria must mention ethnicity in some capacity. It finds itself as a central
feature on nearly all aspects of Nigerian life, especially politics, economics, and culture. A good working
definition for ethnicity for the purposes of this inquiry is, “the employment or mobilization of ethnic
identity and difference to gain advantage in situations of competition, conflict or cooperation.”xix As
Ukiwo expands, this definition highlights two important points to keep in mind when discussing ethnicity:
“The first is that ethnicity is neither natural nor accidental, but is the product of a conscious effort by
social players. The second is that ethnicity is not only manifest in conflictive or competitive relations, but
also in the context of co-operation.”xx He emphasizes that ethnicity does not necessarily have to be
negative, but it is rather the behavior of the ethnic groups in question.
As it pertains to Nigeria, the concept of ethnicity has evolved overtime. The same can be said for
Pakistan, as ethnic configurations differ drastically under colonial India, after the partition of India, and
the creation of Pakistan. What may have been rigid ethnic identifications in the time of the Nok
civilization or ancient Yorubaland is drastically different to what is exists on those same geographical
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regions today. Even the precolonial ethnic identifications have evolved greatly throughout the colonial era
to now.
Before delving into the names, cultures, and traditions of prominent Nigerian ethnic groups, it is
important to highlight how much of the research about these groups during the colonial era was conducted
by anthropological practices now deemed problematic and harmful. Another development in the
discussion of ethnicity in Nigeria includes the historiography of the infamous ethnic conflict. As Ukiwo
explains, some historians have tried to paint previous ethnic conflict as international wars, similar to what
was happening around the same time in Europe in an effort to minimize the negative portrayal of Nigerian
ethnic groups. He goes on to describe the complexities of trying to analyze the ethnocultural formations
of Nigeria without bias:
Nigerian pre-colonial communities were multicultural with a near absence of ethnic bigotry. The
nationalist historiography also tried to de-emphasize the role of the external factor in the rise of
pre-colonial African state and economic systems. It emphasized the agency of Africans… in their
dealings with the Europeans. However, by looking away from the cultural explanations of
ethnicity that fascinated anthropologists, social historians… also lost the opportunity to highlight
the significance of memories of pre-colonial alliances and conflicts to colonial and post-colonial
ethnic formations and conflicts.
There are benefits and drawbacks to both types of research about precolonial and colonial Nigeria, as
much of the major research on the topic has a distinct agenda either against or promoting colonialism.
Monitoring for these biases will provide for a more honest analysis of the ethnic composition of Nigeria.
One of the most populated ethnic groups in Nigeria and the continent of Africa as whole is the
Yoruba people. They make up around 21 per cent of the country, or about 42 million people.xxi This is
only the population within the official borders of Nigeria, but a sizable amount live in neighboring
nations, predominantly the 1 million Yoruba people in Benin where they make up 12 per cent of their
population. With these numbers, the Yoruba are one of the most populous ethnic groups in all of Africa.
Within Nigeria, however, they are not the most numerous, with the Hausa-Fulani people being the most
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populous in the country with an estimated population of 68 million people. Other significant populations
include the Igbo with an estimated 28 million, Tiv and Ibibio with 4.4 million, and the Ijaw with 4
million. 28 percent of Nigeria’s remaining population belong to the other 235 ethnic groups within the
country. All of these populations have varying levels of political and economic influence depending on
the region of the country.
xxii

Scholarship now shows that the modern interpretations of these ethnic groups are closely tied

to their colonial history. As Onwuzuruigbo states, “Nigerian ethnic groups have their social meaning only
in terms of the development of Nigeria. As social formations, these ethnic groups are not older than
Nigeria.’xxiii It is impossible to analyze how these ethnic groups interact today with taking in to account
the groups’ respective roles in colonial society.
The Three Most Populous Tribes: In the case of the
Yoruba people, the impact of colonialism has redefined
what it means to be a part of the group and how they
interact amongst themselves and with the greater
Nigerian population. The first traces of the modern-day
Yoruba people can be linked to fifth century BCE in the
ancient city of Ile-Ife. The city served as one of the first
major empires of the Yoruba people. Its influence began
to wane with the emergence of the Benin and Oyo
Empires, also of Yorubaland. There multiple groups of
people or ‘ethnic groups’ within Yorubaland, speaking
the language and under the same empires’ rule. The Oyo Empire came into influence filling the void of
historical Ife, which is still important in Yoruba culture to establish legitimacy.xxiv The Oyo Empire
remained potent from the 17th to the 19th century leading up to internal wars within the Yoruba
community and also invasions from the Fon people of the Dahomey kingdom of contemporary Benin and
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the Muslim Fulani people of Northern contemporary Nigeria. This collapse led to movement of the
Yoruba people within Nigeria and a series of Yoruba wars that lasted until 1886.
The invasion of the British shifted the role and perception of the Yoruba people amongst
themselves and the other surrounding ethnic groups. Before colonialism, the Yoruba practiced their own
form of government and religious practices, many of which are intertwined with today’s Yoruba people
and culture. Yoruba people today practice many religions, predominantly Christianity, although there are
some Muslims as well. Depending on how urban the population is, some Yoruba people still practice the
traditional religion, although many Yoruba Christians and Muslims are still influenced by traditional
religious practices and beliefs. Better understanding of the history and identity of one of the most
numerous tribes in Nigeria is important to better understanding the current state of the country’s
government.
The Igbo are another one of the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria. Their history, like the
Yoruba stretches back to ancient times. However, unlike the Yoruba and the Hausa, there is mystery
surrounding the origins of the Igbo. Some believe the origins of the Igbo come from ancient Israel, and
there has been recent scholarship to support this thinking.xxv Some research points to the Igbos possibly
being one of the lost tribes of Israel that migrated to West Africa and cites similar cultural patterns as
proof. Acknowledgement of this possible history is another reminder to recognize the precolonial identity
and history of these ethnic groups.
In the modern era, the Igbo people and their identity are another example of colonialism
transforming the identities of the group. Although there is a historical Igboland in the southeastern part of
Nigeria, unlike the Yoruba, the Igbo were not a cohesive political structure like their other ethnic
counterparts. There was no monarchical political structure for the Igbos pre-colonialism. Rather, it was a
collection of autonomous local communities that then developed into what we know of Igbo people today
during the 20th century. The coalition of a major ethnic identity came after colonialism. It was through
their experience, ultimately culminating in the Biafra War, in the Igbo attempt to secession, did the Igbo
come together as an early form of its modern entity.

Tella-Martins 17
The Hausa-Fulani are the most populous and one of the most dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria.
The Hausa people have historically been located in the Northern regions of Nigeria. Modern settlements
of what is known as Hausaland dates back to 1000 CE in parts of the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa.
During 1400 -1800 CE, also known as their peak era, the Hausa were one of the most powerful groups in
the region.xxvi This ethnic group is distinct from the other two because of its historical ties to Islam.
Before the empire of Mali introduces them to Islam, the Hausa were isolated and had a centralized and
formal governmental structure like the Yorubas did. They transitioned to a monarchical system and along
with it, developed a more unified identity much before colonialism. The move toward these structures
starts in the 14th century with the Malian empire’s influence.xxvii Early in the 19th century, the Hausa were
conquered by the Fulani, a Muslim theocracy originating in Western Sudan. Since then, the two ethnic
groups have been closely intertwined in the history of Nigeria which prompts them to be referred to as the
Hausa-Fulani. The Fulani continued to intermarry with the Hausa and today their postcolonial identity is
deeply connected.
After British colonialism, much like other Nigerian ethnic groups, a sense of identity shifted and
deepened in contrast to other groups. As some scholarship has shown, the idea of Hausaland and
‘Hausaness’ has evolved during colonialism due to the differing experiences and motivations experienced
due to the new borders:
through colonial censuses and other documentation, also demonstrates how Hausa identity has
extended to areas outside of traditional Hausaland and to non-Hausa ethnic groups. … They can
claim a twofold distinctiveness, in fact, for they distinguish themselves not only from their
Yoruba neighbors but from Hausa communities elsewhere. … The question of Hausa ethnicity is
complicated by the existence in Hausaland itself of two competing standards of what constitutes
Hausa identity. Hausa ethnicity, then is fluid, multilayered, and evolutionary. (44-46)xxviii
Miles is discussing the ever fluid notion of Hausaness and how the concept has changed with colonialism.
The Hausa people, as he mentions, are one of the most numerous tribes in all of West Africa, with people
who claim Hausa identity lying in multiple nearby countries including Niger, Benin, Chad, and Cameroon
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to name a few. Miles also talks about how people specify which ‘kind’ of Hausa they identify with by
using a different descriptor of their ethnic identity and region in front of it. Examples include the Sabo
Hausa, Kanuri Hausa, or the Fulani Hausa. Depending on the new country in which they reside, the
additional ethnic marker not only identifies them as what they are, but what they are not. In the case of the
Hausa-Fulani mainly found in Nigeria, Islam, and the ethnicity which is more similar to other groups
from the Sahel, northern and Eastern Africa than the Southern Nigerian states, heightened a sense of an
intertwined Hausa-Fulani identity.xxix This division serves as an early marker for the North versus South
split still seen today in Nigerian politics.
Religion: The relationship between Nigeria and religion is a complex one in which its modern origins can
best be understood at the start of colonialism. While the North had already been predominantly Muslim
since the introduction of the empire of Mali around the 14th century, Christianity in Nigerian was a
consequence of colonialism. It is not as simple as the North being Muslim and the South being Christian,
as religious minorities exist in both regions. Further, the Southwestern part of Nigeria has a reputation for
being a more diverse place not only regarding religion, but ethnicity as well. About 45% of the country
identifies with some form of Christianity, another 53% identifies with Islam, with the remaining
percentage practicing traditional forms of worship.
The country as a whole could be described as deeply religious, regardless of which monotheistic
religion the majority of the country practices. The overall devoutness of the people contributes to the
religious tensions that exist within the country. In the day to day lives, one could articulate that presence
of religious plurality has promoted tolerance and inclusion. Religious tolerance varies depending on the
region of the country. For example, the population of Christians in the North has dwindled due religious
violence and the Christians fleeing from the area. The South is predominantly Christian, with the Middle
Region being comprised of a combination of ethnic minorities and religious diversity.xxx The religious
landscape in the country is increasingly polarized. Additional issues of ethnic conflict are exacerbated by
the religious ones. The prominence of Boko Haram, a militant Islamic group originating in Northern
Nigeria and continued Christian and Muslim conflict in the middle of the country are two examples of the
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large political impact religion has within the country. Although there are continued attempts and desires
from the Nigerian people for increased inclusion, issues regarding their respective identities and the
complications that accompany them frustrates this goal. Religion is an additional layer which is crucial in
understanding their current political and government makeup.
Nigeria’s Civil War: The Nigerian Civil War, otherwise known as the Biafran Civil War, took place
from 1967-1970. The war started when the purported Republic of Biafra wanted to secede from the rest of
Nigeria and create its own state. Biafra was comprised of majority Igbo people and the state was located
in the Southeastern region of Nigeria. Scholarship on this topic is increasingly polarized as many Igbo
people and scholars are beginning to refer to the war as a genocide due to the high number of casualties
on the Igbo side. On the other hand, information from the other side can ignore the vitriol for another
ethnic group that caused Nigeria’s bloodiest war. Studying the Civil War is important to understanding
the current landscape of Nigeria’s political structure, as notions of ethnic identity and allegiances were
irrevocably shifted after this war.
The genesis of the war comes from stark ethnic lines constructed after colonialism. After the
arrival of the British, these ethnic groups who primarily operated under their own dynasties and lineages
were suddenly bound together under one rule of law. When certain groups began to experience privileges
others did not, suddenly you see the development of the modern concepts of ethnicity within the ethnic
groups. As much as the sense of self comes from what you are, it also comes from what you are not.
Yoruba people who were previously living in within their own local communities, practicing their own
religions are suddenly infusing Christianity into their culture. They are beginning to recognize themselves
as one unified group and separating themselves from neighboring groups like the Hausas and the Igbos.
The British, like in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa practiced indirect rule as their form of
colonialism. Indirect rule meant there were not white settlers coming in like in South Africa or the United
States, but this does not minimize the impact the British had on the lives of people who were living
there.xxxi British officials still had their own living areas separate from actual Nigeria, and to this day,
those areas are still some of the more developed parts of the country, Ikoyi in Lagos is an example. A
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primary source regarding the division of Nigeria as a protectorate of the British Empire comes from an
obviously biased source: an English statesman William Geary. Although the scholarship is heavily biased
in one direction, there can be some generally useful information to take from it. Although the British had
been around Nigeria for around 100 years, they officially became a member of the Empire in late 1890s,
early 1900s, “Mr. J. Chamberlain selected Brigadier-General Lugard as the first Governor of Northern
Nigeria, an excellent selection for a pioneer administration. In 1906 Southern Nigeria and Lagos were
amalgamated into the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and in 1914 Southern and Northern
Nigeria were amalgamated.”xxxii
The British had varying relationships and perceptions of the different tribes and regions. For
example, Geary personally believed the Yorubas were the ‘most intelligent’ of the group because of their
‘welcome acquiescence.’ Other sources relay the British preferred living in Northern Nigeria amongst the
Hausa-Fulani. The three initial divisions Geary describes that were later joined into one Nigeria were
representative of the major ethnic groups: Lagos, Western Nigeria – Yoruba, Southern Nigeria – Igbo,
and Northern Nigeria – Hausa-Fulani. When the world began to move toward independence, like most
other former colonies, the concept of unification under one nationalist identity was much easier. The new
country had discovered oil, and the prospects for a new, united Nigeria were optimistic. Also, like other
colonies after independence was achieved, for Nigeria this was in 1960, the divisions that existed during
colonialism rose to the surface. Again, in Nigeria’s case this prompted one of the deadliest conflicts in
sub-Saharan Africa in the 20th century and the deadliest one in Nigerian history. A quick summary of the
details of the war are as follows:
The Nigerian Civil War was the result of ethnicised political conflict. Nigeria was divided into
three main regions, which were each dominated by one ethnic group: Hausa and Fulani in the
Muslim north, Yoruba in the Southwest, Ibos in the Southeast. In January 1966, a group of
mainly Ibo officers initiated a coup d’état and installed a military government. This was answered
by a counter-putsch by northern Nigerian soldiers in July and massacres against Ibos in Northern
Nigeria in September. These outbursts of violence provoked a flow of some two million Ibo
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refugees to Federal Nigeria’s South-Eastern state. On May 30, 1967, the South-East’s political
leadership around the Oxford-educated General Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu declared
their independence, and the Nigerian Civil War began with the advance of federal troops into
Biafran territory on July 6, 1967. After two and a half years of fighting, Biafra surrendered on
January 15, 1970.xxxiii
The total body count for the Nigerian Civil War is truly unknown due to political motivations by the
Nigerian, British, and American government favoring a unified Nigeria trying to downplay the crisis and
an inaccurate calculation of civilian death due to famine and disease or violence. Estimates go from
500,000 to 6 million, with added credence given towards given to higher figures.xxxiv
Minority communities of Igbos before the start of the war were fleeing from persecution in the
North due to their economic growth. This prompted the attempted coup, which worsened the ongoing
violence. When the Igbos felt unsafe in other parts of Nigeria, they retreated to their ancestral homeland
and declared their own state, Biafra. Another layer to the war is the location of the newfound oil. Seeing
as one of the most politically dominant groups in the country were the Hausa, yet the location of the oil
was primarily in de facto Igbo territory, there were tensions surrounding which group would profit from it
the most. Scholarship has retrospectively emphasized the danger the Igbos were in before the war, and the
suffering they endured during the war. It was almost inevitable the Nigerian government would come out
victorious, as many civilians did not have much access to food and famine broke out.
The Nigerian Civil War is a combination of thousands of years of complex ethnic relationships
and history. Understanding the basics of it and colonialism are imperative to understanding the country’s
current political and government structure. Even through scratching surface of these issues, it is clear to
see how complicated Nigeria as a concept and reality is. Colonialism found a way to exacerbate existing
tensions. It created identities not only out of sameness, but difference and disdain for other groups for
purpose of survival – culminating in a civil war. Today, the people still feel its legacies, and there are
residual ethnic tensions the country still reckons with.
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A Brief Introduction to Pakistan: Pakistan, much like Nigeria, was a former crown in the British
Empire. They are the sixth most populous nation in the world, slightly ahead of their West African
counterparts, with numbers nearing 210 million people. To understand the current climate of Pakistan, it
is important to understand the history of the South Asian subcontinent and historical India of which
current Pakistan is a part of. However, Pakistan is different to Nigeria in that the country, although it
possesses different ethnicities that influence their modern culture, the country’s historical identity is not
comprised of hundreds of ancient civilizations that came to one unified identity.
Ethnic Foundations: One of the defining characteristics are the borders it shares with its neighbors,
namely India and Afghanistan. These connections go back thousands of years, as the boundaries of the
ancient civilization of the Indus Valley are modern day Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. Some estimates
date this era from 6500 BC - 1300 BC. The Indus Valley Civilization is one of the earliest in humanity
and developed agricultural, cultural, and urban settlement patterns that were the starting point for what
has evolved into modern society.xxxv The modern-day Pakistani people descended from those within the
region and other Indo-European communities, including the Persians in modern day Iran.
After the decline of the Indus Valley tradition came the rise of the Vedic period which lasted
from about 1500 BC – 500 BC. The Vedas are an important development from this time period and serve
as the earliest literary record of Indian culture.xxxvi The Vedas are in part a religious text as they pay
homage to and define multiple gods and cosmic phenomena in Indian culture. It also lists out rituals,
ceremonies, and prayers for readers to follow. These texts were a part of the oral transition and some
contain hymns originating from Aryans who entered the area from Iranian regions. The Vedas serve as
proof as a connection between Sanskrit, Greek and Latin and later to other European languages. It also
causes speculation for a common Indo-European ancestry which is still debated today.
The mix of people found of these ancient and early modern empires were a collection of Greeks,
Persians, and Indians (in the historic sense). These collections of people serve as a historical foundation
for ethnic groups found today in Pakistan. What separates Pakistani identity and heritage is the
combination of differing empires and peoples that were an important part in the evolution of the modern-
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day Pakistani people. Comprehending the basics of the ancient composition of these peoples better serves
to understand their complex identification today.
Influence of Islam: The last dynasty before Islamic influence and conquest in the 7th century comes from
the Rai dynasty of Sind. The Rai dynasty ruled from the 500 – 700 CE. The origins of these rulers appear
after the waning influence of the Sasanid Empire (Persians). Most of the scholarship of this dynasty is
chronicled by the Arabs as they were conquered in 712 CE.xxxvii Modern historians have tried to restore
the rulers’ names to their original Sanskrit instead of Arabic. This dynasty was ethnically and culturally
similar to other Indian rulers and the rulers practiced Buddhism. They were similar to other dynasties of
their time and never imposed a religion on their people and generally supported both Hindu and Buddhist
beliefs.
The divisions between the Pakistani people and the rest of the Indian subcontinent go back all the
way to medieval times. The government today believes their current nation traces its roots back to the
struggle of South Asians of the Muslim faith wanting a place to call their own:
The impact of Islam on the South-Asian subcontinent was deep and far-reaching. Islam
introduced not only a new religion, but a new civilization, a new way of life and new set of
values. Islamic traditions of art and literature, of culture and refinement, of social and welfare
institution, were established by Muslim rulers throughout the subcontinent. A new language,
Urdu, derived mainly from Arabic and Persian vocabulary and adopting indigenous words and
idioms, came to be spoken and written by the Muslims and it gained currency among the rest of
the Indian population.xxxviii
With the introduction of Islam, it created a new identity and way of life for people of this region versus
the rest of the subcontinent. These are divisions that have only deepened since time has gone on. Islam is
one of the many ethnic factors that separate it from India, with their different conquests and rulers in
ancient and early medieval times creating this schism as well.
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With the Arab conquest in 711 CE marks the beginning of the modern semblance of Pakistani
identity. Not only do they have cultural times to their Indian neighbors, but they share a lot with the West
Asian population as well:
While Pakistanis resemble other North Indian population groups in their appearances, cultures
and customs, they are also akin to their West Asian counterparts in many ways. Since the spread
of Islam from the seventh century, followed by centuries of Muslim rule, West Asia emerged as
the dominant factor in Pakistani demography. Interestingly, many Pakistanis – especially the
Muslim groups – seek their genealogies, Central Asia, and the Middle East, while there are some
Muslims in Karachi and coastal areas … whose ancestors came from Africa.xxxix
This speaks to the historical and cultural differences that have existed between India and Pakistan for
more than a millennium. The influence of Islam obviously impacts their religious expressions, but as seen
with the Nigerians and the Hausa, it impacts their political and xlgovernmental structures.

The Problem of Pakistan: One of the misconceptions of the commonly referred to ‘Problem with
Pakistan’ is that Islam was the only reason Pakistan had a desire to be separated from the rest of India.
Although it was a large factor that exacerbated others, there were ideological and political motivations
that made the partition of India and the creation of an independent Pakistan inevitable. The three main
differences relate to the unit of representation, the basis of representative status and the organization of
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representative bodies.xli Scholarship says one of the primary difficulties in India’s constitutional Congress
was the insistence of the principal of majority rule and the Muslim League’s commitment to numerical
configurations being irrelevant to politics. These are concepts that have not been fully reconciled today.
In general, the concept of majority rule makes the most sense to most people. If more than half of
a group of similar people agree to something, everybody in said group should be beholden whatever it is
the majority decides. For example, say there is a group of 10 people. In this case, if eight people agree to
one thing and two agree to another, the group should be beholden to the ideas of the eight. It makes sense,
in theory. Most of the people in a group want to do one thing, and only a small minority want to do
another. For the good of the most people in the group – the eight wins. In a case where the group has a
consistent significant minority population, in this example four, this logic is harder to follow. If the ideas
of the six are constantly ruling over the ideas of the four, shutting out the minority ideas will naturally
create more tensions. Nearly half of the group, but not quite enough to overrule the other side will
continually face disappointment. In a way, this is what the Muslim League and other Indian Muslims
were facing politically: always having enough people to have a say, but never enough people to have their
voices politically validated.
In an analysis that applies not only to Pakistan, Nigeria and other post-colonial states as well,
Farzana Shaikh expands on the differences between western ideas of political representation and Islam.
Shaikh speaks to the division between the European concept of the individual and the Islamic priority of
community:
Modern liberal representation has, on the whole, tended to assume that the unit of representation
consists primarily of the individual and his interests. This quintessentially European view ... was
vitally related to the principle of individual equality. … the rights of individuals were being
upheld against the established orders of Church, State, and landed aristocracy. In Islam … the
preoccupation with communal identity has necessarily entailed a focus upon communal claims
and the communal group as the basic unit of representation and focus of loyalty. … Muslims tend
… to evaluate their situation in primarily communal terms. … the liberal notion of individual
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political autonomy is often seen to be wholly alien to the normative contextual framework of
Islam.xlii
One of the overarching problems with the concept of a multiethnic state is the incongruent European
ideals mixing with African and Asian ideas of community and governance. In the case of India and
Pakistan, trying to create a coalition government between predominantly Muslims and Hindus would
produce continued isolation experienced by the Muslims which at its best would lead to unfavorable
policies and its worst could lead to state sanctioned marginalization and oppression.
In short, it is not sufficient to have a simple majority rule a country that has such a large number
of competing interests, complicated ethnic tensions, and diverse religious populations. As the creation of
the state of Pakistan proves, people will always seek their own homeland, where decisions can be made
from a group of their peers, groups of people who have similar intentions and histories.
Modern Ethnic Divisions: Along with their cultural and religious distinctions, there are ethnic
separations that go to this time period as well. Pakistan’s ethnic breakdown is as follows: 45% of their
population are Punjabi, 15% are Pashtun (Pathan), Sindhi are 14%, Saraiki are 8%, Muhajirs are 7%, and
Balochi are at 3% with an additional 6% of assorted ethnic groups.xliii Understanding their ethnic
compositions is fundamental to analyzing their modern day multi ethnic government. Pakistan has about
six major ethnic groups in the country that are not necessarily confined to any one region:
Although all the provinces of Pakistan are pluralistic, they also include some age-old ethnolingual identities such as Balochi, Punjabi, Sindhi, and Pushtun [Pashtun]. But these ethnic
identities are not so clear-cut, as there are further regional and lingual variations within each
province. … It is generally the language and region that determine the ethnic origins of
Pakistanis.xliv
Urbanization and displacement are the primary causes of this development. The official language of
Pakistan is Urdu, which is a combination of Arabic with heavy Persian influences. It has found itself as
the nation’s lingua franca for politics, education, business and more although only seven percent of the

Tella-Martins 27
population who find themselves as native speakers. Each of these groups have distinct identities and
stories that impact how they act today.
Most Pakistani intellectuals can trace their roots from the Semites, Turks, Kurds, Persians, and
Dravidians (South Asians). In other countries, ethnic identities often come with their own regional
attachments. This is not necessarily the case in Pakistan. For example, the Punjabi – the largest ethnic
group in Pakistan – are spread all over the country. This group traces their histories to ancient Indian and
West Asian tribes. The Sindhis live primarily in Sindh and are the descendants of Dravidians, Persians,
and Arabs. The Pashtuns are now the second most numerous group in Pakistan who are settled across the
Pakistani-Afghan border. The Durand Line, as their border is called, is the source for international
political tensions between the two countries. There are Baloch tribes who associate more so with their
counterparts in Iran and Afghanistan and the Kurds rather than the Arabs. Overall, since 1947, the forced
mobility throughout the country and the subcontinent has ‘broken down the traditional territorial
boundaries of these ethnic groups as they live side by side in most of the urban centers of Pakistan.’xlv
Pakistan is the culmination of thousands of years of ethnic movement and religious
diversification. From Hinduism to Islam, the latter of which is still prominent today, Pakistan has
experienced heavy influence from major religious traditions. Even today, there are significant Christian,
Hindu, Sikh, and Zoroastrian descendants or practitioners which contribute to the nation’s role as a
multiethnic society. Combined with their nontraditional ethnic structure and layout throughout the
country, Pakistan serves as a layered experiment into today’s multiethnic governmental project. The
concept of nationalism and moving toward one unified identity rather than smaller ethnic allegiances is an
ongoing process. Knowing the basic history and foundations of its creation is essential for any further
analysis into the potential success or lack thereof within their government and politics.
Dual Analysis
Nigeria and Pakistan in their modern displays mirror each other in multiple areas. Both of these
countries top many economists list as burgeoning superpowers due to their economic capability and
ballooning populations. Although on the surface it appears these countries are headed for prosperity,
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which still is true, they both have underlying issues in which the ethnic xlvicomposition always appears to
be the root of the problem.
Ethnic Overlap
One of the biggest problems facing post-colonial nations today is the reality of ethnic overlap.
Ethnic overlap refers to when the borders of a nation state do not configure directly with the historical
boundaries of an ethnic group. Two key examples in world politics come from Nigeria and Pakistan: the
Hausa-Fulani in the Sahel and the Pashtun along the Durand Line.
In the case of the Hausa-Fulani, the colonial tensions have seeped into modern day conflicts. The
result is the conflation of one group, the Fulani, as a terrorist cell and victims of potential ethnic
cleansing. The Fulani have historically been a group of Muslim nomadic herders. When they came to
Nigeria and spread Islam, they intermarried with the Hausa so much so, they are usually referred to as one
group, the Hausa-Fulani, within the country. The only issue with this, is the Fulani are native to the Sahel,
and have existed and continue to exist without colonial lines.
This presents a problem as in no
one country, except for Nigeria in which
they essential share ethnicity with another
group, do they have a majority. As a
minority everywhere they are, along with
their identity as nomads, it presents a
challenging conflict on a basic level. Now
factor in othering and violence, the Fulani
are now seen as a scapegoat nearly
everywhere they go. Nigerian journalist,
Aliyu Tilde, states, “You'll find that whenever there is a conflict, it is not usually the Fulani who begin
that conflict. You will find that they were under attack and they were trying to protect themselves, or they
were carrying out a reprisal attack.xlvii The Fulani have the challenge of being perpetual minorities in a
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political and territorial sense. There are three types of conflicts the Fulani typically experience: land
disputes, gang criminality, and political power. The last of these conflicts, Tilde states, leads to ‘ethnic
cleansing.’
The political disputes come from local leaders trying to strengthen their own power among their
respective ethnic group by agitating minority ones, of which the Fulani can be. Some actors in these
conflicts have ties to Boko Haram, a jihadist group stationed in Northern Nigeria and nearby parts of the
Sahel.
For the land disputes, the Fulani, nomadic herders, come into contact with local farmers. Cattle
may be destroyed or stolen, and different groups may assert land ownership with no ability to definitively
prove one way or another. Climate change is exacerbating this problem, as the climate is causing herders
and farmers to shift their usual pattern which leads to conflict. A lack of job opportunities in the rural
North leads the youth to gang violence and other criminal activity. In the epicenters of this Fulani crisis in
Mali and Nigeria, the weakness of the government contributes to the perpetuity of this issue, “In both
countries the state monopoly is not guaranteed. And when the state offers no security and crime goes
unpunished, people turn to their own form of justice and the distrust between different population groups
increases.”xlviii The colonial boundaries leave groups like the Fulani people without a state and subject to
violence and tumult nearly everywhere they go. Their presence in multiple nations complicates the power
of any state to take decisive action on these issues, especially states that have continual security threats.
The concept of ethnic overlap is another factor that calls into question of the functionality of a multiethnic
state.
For Pashtuns, one of the most populous ethnic groups in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, state
loyalty is even more complicated than usual seeing as there are significant parts of the population,
including family living on both sides of a tense line. The Durand Line is a 1600-mile border between the
countries, with the majority of Pashtuns living on either side of it, although some can be found in
surrounding provinces. The Pashtuns are the biggest ethnic group in Afghanistan and second largest in
Pakistan, although there are 11 million Pashtuns in Afghanistan versus Pakistan’s 25 million.xlix On the
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one hand Pakistan have more numerical Pashtuns living within their borders. On the other hand, one
could argue the Afghan identity is synonymous with Pashtun, seeing as a majority of the country’s
population come from this ethnic group.
l

Some of the biggest implications in the

conflict from Afghanistan and Pakistan comes
from superpowers utilizing these countries as
proxies to serve their own personal interests. This
problem is entirely colonial in design and has
tensions that date back to the 1800s. Afghanistan,
historically aligned with Russia, and Pakistan,
then part of British India, had an arbitrary line
drawn between the Pashtun tribal lands, giving
half of the territory to India, while the other half
remained with Afghanistan.li The line has been
met with constant disapproval from those living
on both sides, and deprived Afghanistan its access
to the Arabian Sea. When the British left,
Afghanistan wanted to revisit the Durand Line and the specifications of the border, a request which was
ultimately denied.
This is the genesis of fraught relations between the two countries, as Afghanistan was later the
only country who voted against Pakistan joining the United Nations upon its creation in 1947. During the
Cold War, Pakistan became an ally of the United States and Afghanistan continued their relationship with
the Russians which further tensions in their own relationship. Suddenly the problems of the world’s
largest superpowers were overarching the interests of the question of Pashtun.
Afghanistan has always been proponents of utopic ‘Pashtunistan’ to be contain the ethnic
Pashtuns between both countries, which has always been denied swiftly from the United States, United
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Kingdom, and Pakistan. The concept of an ethnicity having claims to their own homeland is not unique to
this area. These tensions along the Durand Line have not settled, as there are casualties upwards of 200 on
Pakistani as recently as 2017.lii
The issue of ethnic overlap is far from over and the Hausa-Fulani and the Pashtuns are simply an
example. These issues of ethnic overlap serve as reminders that not only does the modern concept of
ethnicity impact states’ internal relations but can further frustrate external ties. Conflicts like these,
especially seen with the Fulani in the Sahel weakens the already complicated functionality of the Nigerian
government. These are one of the many problems associated with colonialism creating boundaries with
strategy in mind first and thinking of the ramifications to those ethnic communities later.
Wealth & Standard of Living
One of the main pitfalls of Nigeria and Pakistan is their high economic achievement and GDP
juxtaposed with their citizens’ lower standard of living. Wealth distribution and income inequality are by
no means unique to these two states, but when you analyze them as a whole, there is a definite separation
between the many and the few. A nation's GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates is the
sum value of all goods and services produced in the country valued at prices prevailing in the United
States. Nigeria and Pakistan rank 24 and 25, respectively. Both of these countries rank significant lower
when calculating for the standard of living per country with Nigeria ranking 166, and Pakistan ranking
171.liii There are questions not only surrounding the amount of wealth not being distributed with the
masses, but which ethnic group has the political power, means, and capital in these countries. The
question of the wealth and quality of life within a multiethnic state is one of the primary components that
can help determine its overall functionality.
In Nigeria, the issue of wealth inequality is further complicated due to the political and ethnic
configurations within the country. Officially, Nigeria is the Federal Republic of Nigeria and subscribes
governmental structures most similar to the United States, with a President, a bicameral legislature in the
House of Assembly, and a Supreme Court. Although Nigeria considered, and eventually rejected the idea
of creating political parties based on ethnic identifications, they decided to create political federations
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based on the different regions, North, Western, and Eastern, which prioritized the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba,
and Igbo’s respective needs. This prompted tensions among smaller ethnic groups who believed their
interests would be ignored.
During the Civil War, one of the primary issues were the locations of the oil reserves. Seeing as
their located in Eastern territory, the Igbo laid claims to them the Nigeran government interfered with
during the war. This highlighted other ethnic tensions as minority populations, such as the Ijaw, laid
stronger claims to the oil that were overshadowed by the more numerous Igbos. After the war, the
government divvied up the oil from the Niger Delta to the different groups within the country, frustrating
the local minorities.liv
The elites from the three major ethnic groups have been able to reap the economic benefits from
the oil fields and political structure while those who claim ancestral ownership of these lands do not see
the fruits of what they believe to be their land. Not only does ethnic conflict impact the three prominent
groups against each other, but occasionally
the powerful, numerous ethnic groups
against the smaller ones. These tensions have
not fully been resolved as for any minority
group to have political impact; they require
the support of other smaller lvethnicities
which proves difficult.
With this in mind, the comparison of
Nigeria’s accumulated wealth, the success of
the few at the top in light of the majority at
the bottom gives further insight into the
complications facing a multiethnic
government. At least 86 million of the 200 million people in the country live in poverty. There is a
constant urban-rural split looking at the wealth in the country. Because of the way of life for many Hausa-
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Fulani communities, the Northern population usually finds themselves in much poorer circumstances than
their Southern neighbors. The difference in wealth between the North and South perpetuates existing
tensions between the two regions. Oxfam reports Nigeria is last in a list 152 countries in their
commitment to lowering levels of inequality. To make matters worse, political power and economic
power go hand in hand. To some, Nigeria is synonymous with corruption and scams. It frustrates the
Nigerian people and scholars alike, because there is obvious potential hindered by selfishness and
continued corruption, “Oxfam has been most critical of the country’s political class, finding that, despite
adequate resources, poverty alleviation has been hampered by “the ill-use, misappropriation and
misallocation of resources.”lvi The wealth is being hoarded among exclusive areas, such as Banana Island
in Lagos where Nigerian billionaires reside, and through political structures in which the three main
ethnic groups dominate. It is a structure designed to fail for the majority, which it currently is. These facts
contribute to this multiethnic state having nearly 74% of its citizens unable to meet the Nigerian minimum
basic standard of living which is about $1000 a year.lvii Although Nigeria’s wealth stratification crisis of
their own making is a remarkable case, it speaks to the general complicated nature of having countries
with multiethnic governments adequately care for all of its citizens rights and needs.
Similar to Nigeria, Pakistan is a country with a large, wealth producing economy with difficulty
ensuring a majority of their citizens reap the benefits. Reading statistics like these are not only difficult to
understand as a person without a connection to the country, but for the citizens as well. Knowing the
economic issues your countrymen and family are facing are solvable with the government neglecting your
needs is at minimum, frustrating.
In a journal entry emphasizing the importance of including ‘social justice’ in a country’s economic
development plans, Khandker discusses the difference between Pakistan’s potential and the reality of its
citizens:
In the first half of the 1960’s, Pakistan was internationally acclaimed as a model developing
country where planning effort was considered a great success. While the economists came to this
conclusion on the basis of the movement of national income, investment, exports, etc., these
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movements did not fulfil the aspirations of the common man who felt that, despite economic
development, he remained poor and had even become poorer in the face of rising prices.lviii
The wealth of a nation is intertwined with the standard of living and perceived quality of life. The story
of Pakistan in the 1960’s is compatible with the story of Pakistan today. If anything, the levels of income
inequality are rising and the gap between the wealthiest few is widening between the lower income
majority.
When a significant portion of your population is not meeting the basic standards of living, as in
the case of Pakistan, it significantly lessens your quality of life and faith in the government. As a
Pakistani research officer at the Centre for Finance for Development paints the picture of income
inequality in the nation, it is still bleak leading to other compounding issues in society:
Income and wealth inequality in Pakistan is from top to bottom. Only 22 persons in the country
have billions of wealth and reserves. The rest spend their life in hunger and poverty. Education
and health infrastructures are on the verge of collapse. Institutions are rotten. Moral and ethical
values are decaying. In addition, extreme inequalities cause rampant corruption in society,
obstruct economic growth, leads to irregular wealth and income distribution, moral and ethical
iniquities, and adversely affect labour and human rights. This portrays an intimidating picture of
the country’s overall economic scenario.lix
Seeing as financial issues can impact the ability to deal with others, namely education and health, the
wellbeing of an economy provides telling information about the overall functionality of the state. It is
clear that the economic situation and wealth disparities are not working for most of the people in the
country. With this in mind, it is important to analyze who are those at the top, and who is more likely to
find themselves at the bottom.
Given the complex ethnic structure of Pakistan, it is worth analyzing whether or not the wealth
disparities within the country have any correlation with its multiethnic structure. Although the impact of
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multiethnic society was a
major factor in the
governmental setup of
lx

Pakistan and contributed to

the flawed economic
structure to date, it is too late
to rectify this structure as the
nation’s regions have become
increasingly homogenous:
Due to the increasing ethnic
heterogeneity of Pakistan's provinces, the growing economic and political inter- dependence, and
increasing cultural homo-genisation, it has become imperative and even possible to seek solutions
to the regional and ethnic problems in a multi-ethnic framework. For example, redrawing of
provincial boundaries, which might have been possible in the early years of Pakistan, is no longer
a viable, or even a problem- solving, option.lxi
It is no longer useful to consider options in which the separate ethnic entities are left to their own devices.
The integrated ethnic framework is here to stay, but that also means its complications are staying with it.
For the most part, the two most prominent ethnicities in Pakistan, the Punjabi and the Pashtuns
(Pushtoons), are the most dominant members of the capitalist class, and maintain the most influence
within the nation. Other, smaller ethnic groups such as the Balochs and the Sindhi are on the outside
looking in the political and military sector and they usually do not find themselves in the capitalist class.
This is impactful due to participation in these sectors translating to wealth and influence within the
economy. Smaller ethnic groups and native Urdu speakers alike find themselves on the margins. Regional
political parties usually fall within ethnic lines, and to gain a majority requires cooperation across
languages and ethnic identities.
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The correlation between economic prosperity and ethnic identity are slightly different from what I
expected but still proves an additional layer of difficulty to the quest of the state to create a fully
functioning multiethnic government. I believed I would find one ethnicity, usually the favored one from
colonialism, would be at the center of governmental power which would translate into wealth. Instead, a
few ethnicities in both Nigeria and Pakistan alike would spar with each other politically but ultimately
hoarding the wealth amongst themselves. This isolates the numerically smaller ethnicities. The Ijaw are
an example in Nigeria, the Balochs are an example in Pakistan. It appears as though class solidarity and
consolidation of wealth and power are paramount. Ethnic divides seem to be vessel to perpetuate the
ruling class’s goals. Minority ethnic populations are often unable to come to agreements across ethnic
boundaries, preventing large coalition building which allows troubling economic structures to continue to
prosper.
Nationalism
Nationalism is an important step post-colonial nations must properly engage into to become an
equal player in the global political game. Being able to convince the population to buy into a concept
bigger than themselves is the hallmark of some of the wealthiest nations on earth. In its worst instances, it
can lead to genocide and world wars. The best representations come every four years in the form of the
World Cups and Olympic Games where an entire nation is rooting for those chosen to represent them. For
Nigeria and Pakistan, those may be the only times the countries have successfully convinced their
population to buy in. Other times, ethnic loyalties reign supreme which complicates the success of the
country and the cohesion of the government. By analyzing Nigeria and Pakistan’s failure with the
necessary ingredient of nationalism, it is easier to deduce the overall functionality of these states and their
multiethnic breakdowns.
As Nigeria scholar, Olusola Olasupo explains, nationalism in Nigeria is a double-edged sword:
while it is central to the nationalist struggles to free Nigeria from the shackles of colonialism and
attempt to galvanise all its ethnic groups together to form a coherent state, it is also the basis for
the current nationalist agitations trying to tear the state apart. Thus, what is believed to be moral
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justification to maintain the sanctity of the state by a group could be termed as an act of
domination by their others who strive to forcefully regain their freedom.lxii
Nationalism was necessary in the state’s creation but in many ways, it is detrimental to its continuation.
Olasupo goes on to describe how true federalism, in which respective regions, thus certain ethnic groups,
will be able to operate semi-autonomously while still being a part of the general Nigerian fabric. He states
this is most compatible with forms of governance pre-colonialism.
Although Nigeria is a federal republic, the government today has influences remaining from
colonialism, chiefly the centralized, dominating form of government. As Olasupo emphasizes, “leaders,
because of personal aggrandisements, hide under the guise of building a virile and united ‘nation-state’ to
maintain the centralist state, mostly dominated by ethnic majoritarian rule.”lxiii In attempts to unify the
country under a nationalist promise, Nigeria has in fact subjected its citizens to the tyranny of the majority
ethnic groups.
Similarly, in Pakistan, the allegiance to ethnic identification has hindered the development of a
general national identity. For Pakistan, one of the main unifying factors is the existence of Islam. It served
as a major foundation for the partition from India and as a unifying factor for other ethnic groups besides
the majority Punjabi to identify with. However, since the partition and an independent Pakistan, Islam has
not proven strong enough to paper over the differences the Pakistani people. As Raja Qaiser, Pakistani
lecturer, explains ethnic loyalties supersede the religious and goes to explain the three main reasons for
this skepticism of the Pakistani people to a uniform identity:
Rising ethnic nationalism has further hindered government efforts to consolidate a singular
religious-based national identity that could transcend local loyalties. Pakistan’s social
demography is divided along linguistic and ethnic orientations, and Islam has not proven
sufficient to unite a group of people divided by diverse languages, castes, cultures, tribes, and
historical experiences. … (1) Inequitable allocation of financial resources; (2) the army’s
dominance over political processes and its tendency to adopt discriminatory policies; and (3) the
political marginalization of the smaller federating units.lxiv
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Qaiser goes on to describe the fractured relationship between other Pakistani provinces and Punjab. It is
the most populous province and the other provinces in the nation perceives Punjab to draw the resources
for themselves while neglecting the others. He concludes by emphasizing that what he describes as a
monolithic national identity has never existed in Pakistan, but a sense of national unity is weaker than it
has ever been. He recommends remedying this through empowering provinces by enabling their political
autonomy and strengthening the economy.
Pakistan and Nigeria share their complicated relationship with the concept of subscribing to an
identity larger than local tribal loyalties. It is easier to maintain positive heterogenous relationships in
urban areas, as evidenced through Lagos and Lahore, Nigeria and Pakistan’s major population centers that
often report better communal relationships than their rural counterparts. Even within these urban centers
the idea of a monolithic national identity is still challenging. As mentioned in the literature review,
transferring loyalties from ethnic configurations to the state is an essential step in modern nation building.
Despite this, the tendency of majority communities in both nations to enact their best interests that are
often incompatible with minority ethnic populations complicates the nationalistic goal. Less minority
populations subscribe to the monolithic national identity, because the national government, usually
comprised of majority groups, neglects their wishes.
Conclusion
Both Nigeria and Pakistan face multiple issues in which their primary concern is not their ethnic
makeup. Internal and external security issues plague both nations. With terrorist cells either originating or
attacking multiple regions of the countries, it makes this one of the most impactful issues the nations are
facing. Climate change is exacerbating ongoing issues regarding urbanization and poverty, prompting the
likelihood of the richer populations and more represented ethnicities faring better than others. Health and
medical outcomes are connected to issues of poverty which are related to questions about overall quality
of life. These are just a few of the complicated issues Nigeria and Pakistan face that are not within the
scope of this inquiry which absolutely contribute to the overall effectiveness of the states as a whole.

Tella-Martins 39
Points for further research should start here and begin to analyze multiethnic states with more equitable
economic reputations to see whether or not those perceptions are warranted.
The task of creating a government that functions for its people is hard. Since the start of the era of
colonialism and the world’s modern understanding of how a nation state will function, there always have
been and will continue to be issues and complications. What is covered within the scope of this inquiry is
understanding for how much of the global population does this system work. If it is not working, then
who is it working for? What does the minority do? Is it possible for this system to change?
When analyzing the formations of these nation states that date back millennia, it is difficult to say
this system is working for these countries. A fully functioning multiethnic state should include a majority
of the state’s population, regardless of ethnic background, being able to affirm the government works for
them and center their interests. A large percentage of the population of both these countries cannot meet
the basic minimum standard of living. The number is much higher for the minority ethnic populations.
There is a connection between representation in government and ethnic population size. Although these
issues do not uniquely plague nations with multiethnic formats, the complex ethnic composition worsens
them and provides a bleak picture for how to move forward.
Based on wealth and economic structures, ethnic overlap, and the complications of nationalism, it
is difficult to say modern multi-ethnic governments are fully functional. Those at the top can always
claim it is functional enough, but that neglects those at the bottom, whose experience should be just as
valuable. Shared colonial trauma and experiences have not proven enough to connect the identities of all
the ethnic groups within one country. Hearing the complaints of minority ethnic populations in both
Nigeria and Pakistan which include but are not limited to separation from the political process, economic
neglect, isolation from the national identity, and in some case ethnic violence it is difficult to label their
respective governments as fully functional.
Although it is generally too late to have divvy up these nation states, have create new ones strictly
on ethnic lines, something must be done about the current semi-federal structures that isolate too much of
the countries’ populations. Having a more developed federal system, in which minority ethnic populations
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are able to have more of a stake in the national agenda and feel more included seems to be the only way
forward. As it stands, the modern government and political makeup of Nigeria and Pakistan rejects a
significant minority population of their respective countries, eroding the notion of them being fully
functional multiethnic states.
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